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I. INTRODUCTION 
Law firms have traditionally been organized as general partnerships.1  
Although many firms have now registered as limited liability 
partnerships to shield partners against vicarious liability in whole or 
part,2 the general partnership has been the predominant law firm 
organizational form.3  For years, lawyers have proudly announced their 
elevation to partner as evidence of significant personal and professional 
achievement.4  “Making partner” or being “made a partner” has long 
been an important career milestone for lawyers in private practice.  As a 
matter of professional prestige, referring to oneself and one’s colleagues 
as “partners” is appealing.  Despite well-publicized generational 
differences, most law firm associates aspire to partnership.5 
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 1. LESLIE D. CORWIN & ARTHUR J. CIAMPI, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS § 1.01 
(2009). 
 2. Registering a general partnership as a limited liability partnership (LLP) does not result in 
the formation of a new partnership entity.  Hart v. Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh, L.L.P., 877 So. 
2d 1157, 1163 (La. Ct. App. 2004).  A general partnership’s registration as a LLP affects only the 
partners’ potential liability exposure; a general partnership that registers as a LLP is otherwise 
governed by the state’s partnership laws.  Id. at 1162. 
 3. Law firms are also organized as professional corporations and, less commonly, as limited 
liability companies (LLCs).  Occasionally, a law firm name may end with the word “Chartered” or 
the abbreviation “Chtd.”  This is not yet another organizational form.  Rather, states may require law 
firms organized as professional corporations to so identify themselves by ending their firm names 
with “Chartered,” “Professional Corporation,” “Professional Association,” or the respective 
abbreviation.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2711 (2008) (requiring the use of “Chartered,” 
“Professional Association,” or their abbreviations at the end of professional corporations’ names). 
 4. Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture, and the Lore of Partnership: Of Entrepreneurs, 
Accountability, and the Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 794 (2005) 
[hereinafter Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners]. 
 5. Ian J. Silverbrand, Note, Modified Partnership Structures and Their Effects on Associate 
Satisfaction, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 165, 169 (2008). 
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The essence of partnership is equality.6  The law generally treats the 
relationship among or between partners as one of equals.7  Unfortunately, 
equality—for all its virtues—has a downside in professional 
partnerships.  Some partners are simply more productive than others, 
regardless of whether productivity is measured by new business 
generation, the management and expansion of existing client 
relationships, or fees produced as working attorneys.  In some firms, 
productive partners effectively subsidize their unproductive or under-
productive peers.8  The disparity among partners’ relative contributions 
to their firms’ profitability is most acutely observed in terms of new 
business dollars.  Good law firms value all their partners, but because 
clients are the lifeblood of all law firms, they tend to especially value 
rainmakers.  Moreover, once admitted to partnership, there is a risk that 
some lawyers will shirk their responsibilities as partners by not 
attempting to develop new business or expand existing client 
relationships, by not billing as many hours or otherwise generating fee 
revenue as they should, or by failing to participate in the full panoply of 
non-billable activities typically expected of partners—such as serving on 
firm committees, leading practice groups, training junior lawyers, and so 
on.  Although most firms adjust or structure partners’ compensation on 
individual bases to reward performance, relatively unproductive or 
unmotivated partners may still earn handsome livings at the expense of 
their more capable or ambitious colleagues.9 
Equality poses other potential problems.  For example, some 
associates who become eligible for partnership based on years of service 
at a firm may not be prepared to assume the mantle of partnership and 
the professional obligations and responsibilities that come with it, or 
their particular practices may not justify promotion to partnership.  
Under a traditional up-or-out model, firms risk losing valuable lawyers 
for the mere reason that they are not ready to graduate to partnership 
according to an arbitrary schedule.10  Even if a law firm does not adhere 
to an up-or-out philosophy, junior lawyers passed over for partnership 
may become disappointed or disillusioned and, accordingly, leave the 
firm to pursue other opportunities.11 
                                                     
 6. Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 796. 
 7. Id. 
 8. William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in 
the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1694 (2006). 
 9. See id. (citing ALTMAN & WEIL, INC., AM. BAR ASS’N, COMPENSATION PLANS FOR 
LAWYERS AND THEIR STAFFS: SALARIES, BONUSES AND PROFIT-SHARING 16 (1986)). 
 10. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 3.02[2]. 
 11. See id. 
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The perceived deficiencies or inefficiencies of traditional 
partnerships have not been lost on law firm leaders and those who advise 
them, and, in response, the 1970s saw the advent of two-tier 
partnerships.12  Two-tier partnerships are characterized by a top tier of 
partners who hold equity in the firm and a lower tier of partners who do 
not.  Generally speaking, equity partnership is now seen as being 
reserved for rainmakers and other lawyers of special stature, although 
many law firms have numerous equity partners who were effectively 
grandfathered into that status when their firms converted from single-tier 
to two-tier partnerships.  Law firms widely adopted two-tier partnership 
structures throughout the 1980s and 1990s,13 and their popularity 
continues today.  Most large law firms are now either two-tier or multi-
tier partnerships,14 although two-tier partnerships are also found in small 
law firms.15  Many more lawyers are becoming non-equity partners 
rather than achieving equity partner status, with the proportion of non-
equity partners in law firms growing at three times the rate of equity 
partners.16  In summary, “the prize of equity partnership, which includes 
the traditional prerogatives of ownership, is increasingly rare.”17 
Non-equity partners are not uniformly described or identified; some 
law firms refer to them as “income partners,” while others describe them 
as “non-share partners,” “salary partners,” or “contract partners.”  Unlike 
equity partners, who share in a firm’s profits, non-equity partners 
typically receive guaranteed payments out of firm profits that resemble a 
salary.18  Non-equity partners may further receive bonuses depending on 
their achievements or the firm’s profitability.19  They have whatever 
rights and privileges a firm’s partnership agreement affords them.20  
They generally have no interests or rights in the firm’s assets, profits, or 
property beyond the right to be compensated as agreed.21 
                                                     
 12. See Silverbrand, supra note 5, at 171 (reporting that two-tier partnerships were first adopted 
in Chicago in the 1970s). 
 13. Henderson, supra note 8, at 1694–95. 
 14. Id. at 1695 (using the Am Law 200 as a measure); Silverbrand, supra note 5, at 172 
(describing a 2004 report that an estimated seventy percent of firms with seventy-five lawyers or 
more were two-tier partnerships). 
 15. Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 818. 
 16. Henderson, supra note 8, at 1695. 
 17. Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation 
of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1892 (2008). 
 18. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, at § 3.02[2]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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There are three paths to non-equity partnership.  The first is an 
ascending one for associates in law firms.  Some firms first promote all 
associates worthy of partnership to non-equity partner status with the 
expectation that they will pass through the non-equity tier and become 
equity partners after an established period of time.22  Other firms 
promote associates to a non-equity tier and reserve judgment on whether 
equity partnership will follow, with some lawyers becoming equity 
partners as their careers progress and others remaining non-equity 
partners for the duration of their time at the firm.23  Still other firms 
promote especially promising junior lawyers directly to equity 
partnership, while raising others to non-equity partnership.24  Regardless 
of the particular approach employed, the ascending path has at least four 
perceived benefits for law firms: (1) it improves client service by 
reducing lawyer attrition, (2) it minimizes errors in promotion decisions 
by extending the evaluation period for equity partnership, (3) it aligns 
partners’ voting power with their economic contributions to the firm, 
lessening the likelihood of defections by rainmaking partners, and (4) it 
favorably influences market dynamics by increasing the firm’s profits 
per partner—which are calculated solely on the basis of equity 
partners—allowing the firm to more easily lure lateral lawyers and attract 
high-caliber firms for potential mergers.25 
Analyzing two-tier partnership from below, junior lawyers may 
derive value from non-equity partnership in the form of increased job 
stability, and the opportunity to achieve greater work-life balance and 
career flexibility than equity partnership is thought to afford.26  They also 
benefit from the stature and prestige that comes with being described as a 
                                                     
 22. See Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 819 (Non-equity partnership 
“may represent a transition phase between status as an associate and admission to the partnership.  
The status may be used as a means of lengthening the ‘partnership track’ that defines progression 
from associate to partner.”). 
 23. See CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 6.02[3] (stating that non-equity status “allows the 
partners to observe how newly promoted associates handle these responsibilities and integrate 
themselves into the partnership”).  Occasionally, economic conditions force alterations to these 
plans, as when firms convert non-equity partners to equity partners as a means of raising capital.  
See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Some Top Law Firms Tap Partners for Cash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at 
B1 (reporting that DLA Piper planned to convert 200 non-equity partners into equity partners, 
requiring each lawyer to contribute more than $100,000 in capital to the firm); Ameet Sachdev, Law 
Firms’ Woes Likely to Last, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2009, § 1, at 28 (reporting that DLA Piper asked 300 
non-equity partners to become equity partners by paying $100,000 or more because the firm wanted 
to reduce its debt and increase lawyers’ financial incentives). 
 24. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 6.02[3]. 
 25. Henderson, supra note 8, at 1711–12. 
 26. Silverbrand, supra note 5, at 174–75. 
0.6.0_RICHMOND FINAL 1/26/2010  2:49:10 PM 
2010] THE PARTNERSHIP PARADIGM 511 
partner.27  Financially, non-equity partners potentially benefit by 
receiving a guaranteed income, as compared to equity partners, who may 
see their income decrease in years in which the firm performs poorly.28  
Some associates may favor non-equity partnership as a financial matter 
because it does not require them to invest capital in the firm.29 
The second path to non-equity partnership is horizontal in the sense 
that some firms require all lateral partners to join as non-equity partners.  
This approach allows the lawyer moving laterally to decide whether her 
decision was a wise one before cementing it through a capital 
contribution.30  Equally important, it allows the firm to evaluate the 
migrating lawyer in some depth—to see whether, for example, the 
lawyer will actually deliver a predicted or promised book of business—
before committing to equity participation.31 
The third path is a descending one, euphemistically referred to as 
“de-equitization.”  De-equitization refers to the demotion of partners 
from equity status to non-equity status.32  Law firms commonly de-
equitize partners in times of economic stagnation or as a result of 
slowing practices,33 but they also do so as a means of pruning 
unproductive partners.34  De-equitization can be a contentious, upsetting, 
                                                     
 27. Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 820. 
 28. See William C. Cobb, Changing Equity Partners to Non-Equity Status, OF COUNS., Mar. 
2002, at 10, 11 (asserting that non-equity partnership “[p]rotects lawyers from the risks associated 
with being an equity owner, including . . . the risk of lower incomes in poor performance years”). 
 29. Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 819. 
 30. Steven T. Taylor, The Rising Tier: Many Firms Increase Their Non-Equity Partner Ranks, 
OF COUNS., Nov. 2008, at 1, 15. 
 31. See id. (quoting a law-firm-managing partner who says non-equity partnership “allows us to 
be more flexible with someone we’re willing to bet on”). 
 32. See Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 816–17 (using the term “de-
equitized” to describe partner demotions). 
 33. See, e.g., Leigh Jones, Downsizing: Who’s Next?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 12, 2007, at 1, 1 
(discussing de-equitization at large law firms in response to stagnant profits and as a means of 
becoming more competitive); Richard Lloyd, Heavy Lies the Crown, AM. LAW., Feb. 2009, at 20, 20 
(discussing firms de-equitizing partners in response to economic crisis). 
 34. See, e.g., Elizabeth Goldberg, The Departed, AM. LAW., May 2007, at 144, 145 (identifying 
several large law firms orchestrating exits of allegedly under-performing partners); Jones, supra note 
33 (discussing firms downsizing equity partner ranks); Nathan Koppel, ‘Partnership Is No Longer a 
Tenured Position’—More Law Firms Thin Ranks of Partners to Boost Profits, Attract, Keep High 
Earners, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2007, at B1 (describing increasingly frequent partner de-equitization, 
expulsion, and “the partner purge” as firms attempt to increase profitability); Lynne Marek, Jenner 
& Block Takes Some Partners Off Equity Level, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 2007, at 10, 10 (reporting on a 
law firm de-equitizing some partners and asking others to leave); Aric Press & John O’Connor, 
Lessons of the Am Law 100, AM. LAW., May 2008, at 131, 131 (reporting that thirty-seven large law 
firms shrunk their equity partner ranks in 2007); Ameet Sachdev, Jenner & Block Law Firm Cuts 
Several Partners, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 2008, § 3, at 1, 6 (reporting on second round of partner de-
equitizations and expulsions at firm). 
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and stigmatizing process.35  For many lawyers, being de-equitized is 
“‘almost like getting fired.’”36  In other instances, lawyers grudgingly 
accept de-equitization as a condition of law firm acquisitions or 
mergers.37 
The widespread acceptance of non-equity partnerships does not, 
however, connote agreement among lawyers or courts on what it means 
to be a non-equity partner, or even whether non-equity partners are in 
fact partners.38  As one respected scholar has observed, non-equity 
partnership “is an oxymoron” because partnership is defined by “co-
ownership and shared personal responsibility,” and non-equity partners 
have neither of these things.39  Other commentators state that non-equity 
partners “are far from genuine partners” in their firms,40 that non-equity 
partners “are not considered partners under partnership or employment 
law,”41 that non-equity partners “are not true partners,”42 and that non-
equity partners are “‘actually . . . highly paid associates.’”43  If these bold 
opinions are accurate, what are courts and the legal profession to make of 
non-equity partners, and what are non-equity partners to conclude about 
their own status?  For example, if non-equity partners are not partners, 
they do not owe one another or the equity partners in their firms a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, nor are they owed this important duty.44  If 
non-equity partners are not partners, they do not owe their colleagues or 
firms other fiduciary duties imposed on partners.45  If non-equity partners 
are not partners, they do not owe the special ethical duties imposed on 
partners under Model Rules of Professional Conduct 5.1 and 5.3.46  If 
                                                     
 35. See Jeff Blumenthal, The Distasteful Medicine of De-Equitization, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 
Dec. 5, 2002, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005533420. 
 36. Id. (quoting legal consultant Joel Rose). 
 37. See, e.g., Heather Cole, Shughart to Thin Equity Partner Ranks, MO. LAW. WKLY., Dec. 15, 
2008, at 2 (describing drastic de-equitizations required to accomplish merger of two large Kansas 
City law firms). 
 38. See CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 1.09[2] (“The definition of a non-equity partner can 
vary from partnership to partnership.”). 
 39. Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 820. 
 40. Silverbrand, supra note 5, at 171. 
 41. Id. at 175. 
 42. Mark Curriden, No Tears for Two Tiers . . . More and More Firms Are Sure Non-Equity 
Partner Slots Benefit Everyone, OF COUNS., Apr. 2001, at 18, 19. 
 43. Henderson, supra note 8, at 1723 (quoting Susan S. Samuelson & L.J. Jaffe, Success and 
Failure, in LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT: A BUSINESS APPROACH § 7 (Susan S. Samuelson ed., 1994)). 
 44. See Eisenstein v. David G. Conlin, P.C., 827 N.E.2d 686, 693 (Mass. 2005) (stating that 
equity partners in a firm “owe each other a fiduciary duty of the utmost good faith and loyalty”). 
 45. Non-equity partners still owe their firms fiduciary duties as agents, however.  See Friedman 
Siegelbaum, LLP v. Pribish, No. A-3027-07T1, 2009 WL 910326, at **7–8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Apr. 7, 2009) (per curriam) (holding that a “contract partner” had a fiduciary duty to the firm). 
 46. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2009) (establishing partners’ supervisory 
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non-equity partners are not partners but are instead employees, are they 
accordingly protected against adverse employment actions under federal 
and state anti-discrimination laws?  These issues and doubtless others 
spawned by non-equity partners’ awkward legal status are important. 
Part II of this Article analyzes whether non-equity partners truly are 
partners in their law firms as a matter of partnership law.  The resolution 
of this critical issue necessarily determines the answers to most other 
questions concerning non-equity partners’ rights and responsibilities 
under partnership law and settles other material issues, such as whether 
non-equity partners owe the ethical duties imposed on partners under 
Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3.  Applying the factors that courts traditionally 
weigh when attempting to determine the existence of a partnership, this 
part rejects the conventional view that non-equity partners are not in fact 
partners.  It thoroughly explains why non-equity partners generally are 
true partners as a matter of partnership and other law despite the 
differences between them and equity partners. 
Part III explores the descending path to non-equity partnership, i.e., 
de-equitization.  More particularly, it navigates partners’ duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in connection with de-equitizations.  Consistent 
with the law of partnership expulsions, this part explains that firms may 
de-equitize partners without incurring related liability so long as they do 
not do so for predatory purposes. 
Finally, Part IV examines employment law constraints on law firms’ 
treatment of non-equity partners.  It concludes that, contrary to the views 
held by many lawyers and scholars, whether law firm partners are 
protected under anti-discrimination laws depends not on whether they are 
equity partners or non-equity partners, but on their workplace control as 
measured by the six factors identified by the United States Supreme 
Court in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells.47  
Equity versus non-equity partner status, without more, is simply not a 
meaningful employment law divide. 
II. NON-EQUITY PARTNERS AS TRUE PARTNERS 
The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) defines a partnership as “an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business 
for profit.”48  The newer Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) 
                                                                                                                       
responsibilities with respect to other lawyers in their firms); R. 5.3 (governing partners’ supervisory 
responsibilities for non-lawyer assistants). 
 47. 538 U.S. 440, 449–50 (2003). 
 48. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6 (1914). 
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defines it the same way,49 further establishing that “the association of 
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms 
a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.”50  
Regardless of the definition selected, the existence of a partnership is 
generally treated as a question of fact,51 although not all courts agree on 
this point.  Some courts see the existence of a partnership as a mixed 
question of law and fact, with the ultimate determination being a 
question of law;52 still others consider the existence of a partnership to be 
a legal question.53  It is perhaps most accurate to say that the existence of 
a partnership is a question of law that depends heavily on the facts.  In 
any event, courts typically search for several factors when attempting to 
determine the existence of a partnership,54 including (1) a common 
enterprise, (2) risk-sharing, (3) expense-sharing, (4) the sharing of profits 
and losses, (5) a joint right of control over the business, and (6) the joint 
ownership of capital.55  Whether the parties hold themselves out to the 
public as partners is another factor to be weighed.56  Not all courts 
consider all factors.  Not every element must be satisfied for there to be a 
partnership,57 and no single factor is conclusive.58  The parties’ intent is 
the primary factor for determining whether a partnership exists.59  As an 
Ohio court explained, “[t]he relevant inquiry is ‘not whether the parties 
                                                     
 49. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997). 
 50. § 202(a). 
 51. See, e.g., Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 335, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); 
Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 628 (D.C. 1990); In re Marriage of Hassiepen, 646 N.E.2d 1348, 
1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Gates v. Houston, 897 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Willson v. 
King, 744 N.W.2d 425, 438 (Neb. 2008). 
 52. Harker v. Peterson, 72 P.3d 949, 952 (Mont. 2003); Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 747 N.W.2d 
519, 521 (N.D. 2008) (quoting Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 666 N.W.2d 444, 446 (N.D. 2003)). 
 53. Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 618 (R.I. 2003). 
 54. See Harrell Oil Co. of Mt. Airy v. Case, 543 S.E.2d 522, 525 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) 
(determining whether a partnership exists “involves examining all the circumstances”). 
 55. Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Fourteenth Street Venture, L.P., 533 S.E.2d 759, 761 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2000). 
 56. See, e.g., Compton v. Kirby, 577 S.E.2d 905, 913 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that 
defendant was aware that plaintiffs were “holding themselves out as ‘principals’” of the partnership 
by signing agreements and approving business cards). 
 57. Willson v. King, 744 N.W.2d 425, 441 (Neb. 2008) (stating partnership factors slightly 
differently). 
 58. Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 627 (D.C. 1990); John Nagle Co. v. Gokey, 799 A.2d 
1225, 1227 (Me. 2002) (quoting Dalton v. Austin, 432 A.2d 774, 777 (Me. 1981)); Kyle v. Brenton, 
584 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); In re Estate of Ivanchak, 862 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2006) (quoting In re Estate of Nuss, 646 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ohio 1994)); Martin v. 
Coleman, 19 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tenn. 2000). 
 59. In re Marriage of Geraci, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Constans 
v. Ross, 235 P.2d 113, 116 (Cal. 1951)); In re Marriage of Hassiepen, 646 N.E.2d 1348, 1353 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1995); Price v. Vattes, 161 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
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intend that the law describe their relationship as a partnership, but 
whether they intend a relationship that includes the essential elements of 
a partnership.’”60 
A partnership agreement is important evidence of the parties’ intent.  
Indeed, it is generally unnecessary for courts to examine the various 
factors indicating or refuting a partnership relation where a written 
partnership agreement can be found,61 although a partnership agreement 
must be clear and the parties must conduct themselves consistently with 
its terms to preempt a court’s analysis of other factors.62 
A. Non-equity Partners in the Courts 
The question of whether non-equity law firm partners are partners as 
a matter of law is a recurring one.63  In D’Esposito v. Gusrae, Kaplan & 
Bruno PLLC, for example, James D’Esposito was forced from his 
position as a non-equity member of Gusrae, Kaplan & Bruno PLLC 
(“Gusrae”).64  Although Gusrae was organized as a professional limited 
liability company rather than as a partnership, the firm apparently 
identified and treated its members as partners.65 
The reasons for D’Esposito’s termination are not apparent from the 
opinion, but he sued Gusrae on a variety of theories and sought a range 
of remedies.66  The trial court rejected his claims on the basis that he was 
                                                     
 60. Mellino v. Charles Kampinski Co., 837 N.E.2d 385, 390 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (quoting 
Allen v. Niehaus, Nos. C-000213, C-000235, 2001 WL 1589169, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 
2001)); see also Byker v. Mannes, 641 N.W.2d 210, 218 (Mich. 2002) (stating the partnership 
inquiry should focus on “whether the parties intentionally acted as co-owners of a business for 
profit, and not on whether they consciously intended to create the legal relationship of 
‘partnership’”). 
 61. See Cmty. Capital Bank v. Fischer & Yanowitz, 850 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008) (stating that whether a partnership exists depends on the parties’ conduct, intention, and 
relationship when there is no written partnership agreement); Joachim v. Flanzig, 773 N.Y.S.2d 267, 
273 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (noting that general indicia of partnership were not relevant where parties 
had a written partnership agreement). 
 62. See In re Brokers, Inc., 363 B.R. 458, 470 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007) (noting that “[a] general 
statement that parties are partners cannot outweigh the conduct of the parties” and referring to the 
absence of “a clear partnership agreement” as justification for examining the various factors that 
indicate the existence of a partnership). 
 63. See, e.g., Morson v. Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP, 616 F. Supp. 2d 171, 172–73 (D. Mass. 
2009) (examining law firm’s residency for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and, since the firm’s 
registered agent in Massachusetts was a “contract partner,” discussing how the law firm’s contract 
partners were essentially senior associates—they were paid a fixed salary, had no voice in firm 
governance or affairs, were not allowed to bind the firm, could not see the firm’s books, etc.). 
 64. 844 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
 65. See id. (describing D’Esposito’s position and the law firm’s identification and treatment of 
him). 
 66. Id. (listing D’Esposito’s theories of recovery). 
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not a partner in the firm.67  D’Esposito appealed, and the appellate court 
affirmed the trial court, explaining: 
Indeed, notwithstanding that plaintiff was called a partner and listed as 
such in Martindale-Hubble [sic], on the firm’s letterhead and tax return, 
and he received distributions of net profits from the firm at a fixed rate, 
he was not responsible for the firm’s rent or losses, was not a signatory 
of the partnership and/or operating agreement, made no capital 
investment and had no ownership interest in the firm.68 
Furthermore, the court noted, D’Esposito “had no control at all” over 
Gusrae’s affairs.69 
In a similar case, Zito v. Fischbein Badillo Wagner Harding, plaintiff 
Robert Zito had been a “contract partner” at Fischbein Badillo Wagner 
Harding (FBWH).70  He sued FBWH and several of its former lawyers, 
alleging that FBWH failed to compensate him for fees that he generated 
while with the firm.71  The defendants countered that Zito was not 
entitled to a share of the fees he produced because he was simply a 
salaried, at-will employee of the firm despite his contract-partner 
designation.72  They asserted that Zito was not a party to the FBWH 
partnership agreement, never guaranteed or agreed to be responsible for 
firm debts, did not share in the firm’s losses, was not issued an IRS 
Schedule K-1 for tax purposes as a partner would be, and contributed no 
capital to the firm.73  Those same facts were pleaded by several former 
contract partners that Zito also sued as evidence that they were not truly 
partners in FBWH and therefore could not be held liable for FBWH’s 
potential obligations to Zito.74  Under the New York Partnership Law, 
“[p]artners are liable for wrongful acts committed by any of them, in 
connection with the partnership.”75  An employee, on the other hand, is 
not.76 
One of the contract partners Zito sued, Menachem Kastner, moved to 
dismiss the action on these grounds.77  Kastner offered two documents as 
                                                     
 67. See id. (referring to his lack of an equity interest in the firm). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 809 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 446. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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evidence that he was an employee of FBWH, not a partner, and therefore 
could not be liable to Zito.78  The first document was his employment 
agreement with the firm, which offered him a choice of being called a 
“contract partner” or a “senior attorney.”79  The agreement, which fixed 
Kastner’s annual compensation and created his position for a one-year 
term, made clear that he would “not be entitled to any equity, accounts 
receivable or assets of the Firm,” and described his relationship with 
FBWH as an “affiliation.”80  The agreement contained no provision with 
respect to Kastner sharing in FBWH’s losses.81  The second document 
that Kastner offered was a Form W-2 issued to him by the firm.82 
The Zito court began its analysis by observing that under New York 
law, the indicia of partnership are joint control over the enterprise, profit-
splitting, and loss-sharing.83  Even where there is joint control and an 
agreement to split profits, the absence of an agreement to share losses 
may defeat a partnership claim because loss-sharing is an essential 
element of partnership.84  The court quickly concluded that Kastner’s 
employment arrangement with FBWH satisfied none of the three 
factors.85  Furthermore, the fact that the firm issued him a Form W-2 for 
tax purposes rather than a Schedule K-1 plainly indicated that he was an 
FBWH employee rather than a partner.86 
In an effort to establish that contract partners shared losses, Zito 
argued that, based on the firm’s method of calculating his bonuses, the 
firm factored overhead costs into contract partners’ compensation.87  The 
court disagreed, finding that FBWH’s allocation of overhead costs across 
its payroll did not constitute loss-sharing and did not otherwise prove a 
required partnership element.88  The fact that lawyers such as Kastner 
elected contract partner status rather than being called senior attorneys 
did not change the analysis.89  The court, therefore, granted Kastner’s 
motion to dismiss.90 
                                                     
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 447. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 446–47 (citing Prince v. O’Brien, 683 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)). 
 84. Id. at 447 (citing Prince, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 507). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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In another case, Davis v. Loftus, disgruntled clients sued their 
lawyers, Michael Loftus and David Engel, and the partners in the law 
firm of Gottlieb & Schwartz for alleged malpractice in a real estate 
transaction.91  One defendant, Anthony Frink, moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that he did not qualify as a partner for purposes of 
vicarious liability.92  Frink was an “income partner.”93  Under the firm’s 
partnership agreement, income partners received a fixed compensation 
set annually by the executive committee, plus a bonus.94  The agreement 
further provided that income partners would not share in the firm’s 
profits or losses.95  Each income partner made a $10,000 capital 
contribution to the firm to be repaid upon withdrawal or dissolution, 
without any adjustment for firm growth or profits since the time it was 
made.96  Income partners had no rights to vote on firm affairs or 
decisions, and were not eligible to sit on the firm’s executive 
committee.97 
Several other income partners joined Frink’s summary judgment 
motion.98  The trial court granted the motion, holding that the income 
partners did not qualify as partners, and therefore did not share liability 
for the acts of the firm’s other partners or employees.99  The plaintiffs 
appealed.100 
The appellate court first noted that the “substance and not the form 
of a business relationship determines whether the relationship qualifies 
as a partnership.”101  Here, the income partners received a fixed salary 
plus bonus and did not share in the firm’s profits or losses.102  While the 
income partners made capital contributions, the firm agreed to repay 
those contributions in full upon the income partners’ withdrawal from the 
firm or the firm’s dissolution, regardless of the firm’s intervening profit 
or loss.103  The firm’s executive committee set income partners’ 
compensation, and the income partners had no right to vote on the 
                                                     
 91. Davis v. Loftus, 778 N.E.2d 1144, 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
 92. Id. at 1148. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1146, 1153. 
 100. Id. at 1153. 
 101. Id. at 1151 (citing Koestner v. Wease & Koestner Jewelers, Inc., 63 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 
1050–51 (1978)). 
 102. Id. at 1152. 
 103. Id. 
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management of the firm or the conduct of its business.104  These factors 
culminated in the court’s finding that the income partners at Gottlieb & 
Schwartz lacked “the essential characteristics of ‘partners’” under the 
Illinois Partnership Act, and therefore they could not be held liable for 
Loftus’s and Engel’s alleged malpractice.105  The court affirmed 
summary judgment for Frink and the other two defendants identified as 
income partners in the partnership agreement that Frink submitted as an 
exhibit to his motion.106  The other income partners not similarly 
identified had their summary judgments reversed and their cases 
remanded for presentation of evidence concerning their partnership 
status.107 
B. Analysis 
It would be easy to conclude from the cases decided to date that non-
equity partners are not partners as a matter of partnership law, but are 
instead employees of the law firms in which they practice.108  That is not 
the conclusion that should be drawn, however, because the relationships 
described in those cases are variously inconsistent with typical non-
equity partnerships.  In D’Esposito, for example, the plaintiff, who was 
judged not to be a partner, did not sign the firm’s partnership 
agreement.109  As a rule, two-tier firms require non-equity partners to 
sign their partnership agreements, and law firm advisors often 
recommend this approach.110  In Zito, the would-be partners were not 
elected as “contract partners,” but selected that designation by circling it 
as an option on their employment agreements.111  In true two-tier 
partnerships, lawyers are elected to non-equity partnership, either by a 
vote of the equity partners or by a vote of all partners; they do not get to 
simply choose their own status or rank.  In Davis, the non-equity partners 
had no right to vote on the management of the firm or the conduct of its 
                                                     
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1153. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1152–53. 
 108. There are, of course, some law firms in which non-equity partners are indeed mere 
employees.  See, e.g., Morson v. Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP, 616 F. Supp. 2d 171, 172 (D. Mass. 
2009) (describing employee status of so-called “contract partners”).  Such firms are the exception, 
however, rather than the rule. 
 109. D’Esposito v. Gusrae, Kaplan & Bruno PLLC, 844 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007). 
 110. See, e.g., CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 3.02[2]. 
 111. Zito v. Fischbein Badillo Wagner Harding, 809 N.Y.S.2d 444, 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
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business.112  In many two-tier firms, non-equity partners vote on all 
issues that come before the partnership except the election of lawyers to 
equity partnership.113  In other two-tier firms, non-equity partners are 
allowed to vote on at least some issues.114  The Davis court was also 
influenced by the fact that the income partners who were repaid their 
capital upon withdrawal or dissolution received no capital increase based 
on intervening firm profitability,115 yet many firms do not repay capital 
beyond that which a terminated or withdrawing partner actually 
contributed.  In summary, lawyers and courts should not form 
assumptions about the legal ramifications of non-equity partnership 
based on cases that confuse general practices. 
To determine whether non-equity partners are partners in their firms 
for purposes of partnership law and professional responsibility, it is 
helpful to compare current law firm practices against factors that courts 
regularly examine when attempting to determine the existence of a 
partnership.  It is also important to consider law firms’ tax treatment of 
non-equity partners and the ramifications of law firms holding out non-
equity partners to the public and profession as partners.  When all of 
these factors are analyzed, it will become clear that the majority rule 
should hold law firm non-equity partners to be partners rather than 
employees, and courts should treat them accordingly. 
1. Partnership Agreements and Parties’ Intent 
Most law firms structured as two-tier partnerships require non-equity 
partners to sign their partnership agreements, just as they require equity 
partners to sign.  Partnership agreements typically do not distinguish 
between equity and non-equity partners except in sections addressing 
compensation, the contribution and return of capital, voting rights, and 
service on select firm committees—for example, executive, management, 
or compensation committees.  These facts reveal the parties’ intent that 
non-equity partners be considered partners in their firms to the extent 
that status has legal ramifications.  Were non-equity partners mere 
employees, on the other hand, there would be no need for them to sign a 
firm’s partnership agreement or to be mentioned therein. 
                                                     
 112. Davis v. Loftus, 778 N.E.2d 1144, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
 113. Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 631, 663 (2005). 
 114. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 1.09[1]. 
 115. Davis, 778 N.E.2d at 1152. 
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2. Sharing Profits 
The UPA and RUPA, which form the bases for state partnership 
statutes, define a partnership as “an association of two or more persons to 
carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”116  Seizing on that 
definition, courts evaluating the relationship between parties generally 
consider an agreement to share in the profits of their common enterprise 
to be an essential element of a partnership.117  Courts follow the same 
approach when determining whether lawyers are partners.118  If one 
person is employed by another and receives a salary or wages, on the 
other hand, the two are not partners.119  The widely-held belief that non-
equity partners are always compensated by way of salary has fueled the 
common perception that they are law firm employees rather than 
partners. 
In fact, profit-sharing is only evidence of a partnership, “rather than a 
required element of the definition of a partnership.”120  Even if it were a 
required element, law firms typically compensate non-equity partners 
through guaranteed payments out of firm profits.121  Although these 
monthly payments resemble a salary and some lawyers describe them 
that way for simplicity’s sake, they are not a salary—they are a share of 
firm profits.122  Indeed, most law firms issue non-equity partners a 
Schedule K-1 for tax purposes, just as they do their equity partners.123  
That would not be the situation if they were paying non-equity partners a 
                                                     
 116. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6 (1914); REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997). 
 117. See, e.g., Peoples Bank v. Bryan Bros. Cattle Co., 504 F.3d 549, 557 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(applying Mississippi law); Argianas v. Chestler, 631 N.E.2d 1359, 1368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
(observing that “a sharing of profits is an essential test in determining the existence of a 
partnership”); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V., 202 S.W.3d 250, 267 (Tex. 
App. 2006) (“A partnership requires an agreement to share profits.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Cmty. Capital Bank v. Fischer & Yanowitz, 850 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008) (finding that law firm was not a partnership because the lawyers did not agree to share 
profits or losses). 
 119. In re Brokers, Inc., 363 B.R. 458, 469 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007) (citing Williams v. 
Biscuitville, Inc., 253 S.E.2d 18, 19–20 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)). 
 120. Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); see also Southex 
Exhibitions, Inc. v. R.I. Builders Ass’n, 279 F.3d 94, 101 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that evidence of 
profit sharing does not compel the conclusion that a partnership exists). 
 121. Douglas R. Richmond, Expelling Law Firm Partners, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93, 128 (2009). 
 122. The fact that these payments are made monthly in fixed amounts does not alter the analysis.  
Equity partners often receive set monthly draws paid out of firm profits, with the remainder of their 
compensation coming in quarterly or year-end distributions. 
 123. A Schedule K-1 is an Internal Revenue Service form which a law firm provides to its 
partners to reflect their shares of income, credits, deductions, etc., for the partnership’s tax year.  A 
K-1 provides a partner with information to report on her individual income tax return.  See Joachim 
v. Flanzig, 773 N.Y.S.2d 267, 271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
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salary.124  Firms use a Form W-2 to report wages, including salaries, paid 
to employees and taxes withheld from them.  Furthermore, most non-
equity partners bear the full cost of any self-employment taxes rather 
than having their firms pay any portion of them or having income taxes 
withheld from their monthly compensation.  Again, these factors are 
consistent with receiving a share of firm profits rather than being paid a 
salary.  Finally, non-equity partners are often paid bonuses from firm 
profits. 
3. Law Firms’ Tax Treatment of Non-equity Partners 
As noted above, the fact that law firms typically issue non-equity 
partners Schedule K-1’s and require them to pay their own self-
employment taxes is consistent with non-equity partners sharing in firm 
profits.  These facts are also independently relevant, inasmuch as courts 
have long considered the good faith filing of partnership tax returns to 
evidence the existence of a partnership.125  It is reasonable to assume that 
a law firm would not issue its non-equity partners Schedule K-1’s unless 
it considered them to be partners.126 
4. Sharing Losses 
As important to the existence of a partnership that profit-sharing 
clearly is, the burden of spreading a firm’s losses is equally essential.127  
Partners in general partnerships are jointly and severally liable in tort for 
the wrongs of their fellow partners committed in the course and scope of 
partnership business, and jointly liable for all other partnership debts and 
obligations.128  Any suggestion that non-equity partners are not truly 
partners because they are not liable for a firm’s losses in the same 
fashion as equity partners, however, misses the mark for at least two 
reasons.  First, the partnership liability landscape has radically shifted 
                                                     
 124. See Zito v. Fischbein Badillo Wagner Harding, 809 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2006) (rejecting lawyer’s claim of partnership where firm issued him a Form W-2 and stating that if 
he was a partner, the firm would have issued him a Schedule K-1); Mellino v. Charles Kampinski 
Co., 837 N.E.2d 385, 391 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (observing that lawyer’s failure to file a K-1 
suggested that he was an employee rather than a partner). 
 125. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 175 (3d ed. 2001) 
(discussing the UPA definition of partnership). 
 126. Cf. id. at 267–68 (discussing partnership tax returns). 
 127. See, e.g., Cmty. Capital Bank v. Fischer & Yanowitz, 850 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008) (finding that a firm was not a partnership because lawyers never “submitted to the burden 
of making good the losses” of the firm). 
 128. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 1.09[3]. 
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with the proliferation of limited liability partnerships (LLPs).  The vast 
majority of law firms organized as general partnerships have now 
registered as LLPs.  This was to be expected, since all states permit 
general partnerships to do so.129  Most LLP statutes effectively eliminate 
partners’ vicarious liability for all partnership debts and obligations, thus 
providing “full shield” protection.  For example, the Minnesota LLP 
statute provides in pertinent part: 
An obligation of a partnership incurred while the partnership is a 
limited liability partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or 
otherwise, is solely the obligation of the partnership.  A partner is not 
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or 
otherwise, for such an obligation solely by reason of being or so acting 
as a partner.130 
Illinois has an identical “full shield” statute.131 
Other statutes provide varying degrees of so-called “partial shield” 
protection.  For example, the Texas LLP statute provides: 
 
A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not individually 
liable, directly or indirectly, by contribution, indemnity, or otherwise, 
for debts and obligations of the partnership arising from errors, 
omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance committed while 
the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership and in the 
course of partnership business by another partner or a representative of 
the partnership not working under the supervision or direction of the 
first partner unless the first partner: 
(A) was directly involved in the specific activity in which the errors, 
omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were committed 
by the other partner or representative; or 
(B) had notice or knowledge of the errors, omissions, negligence, 
incompetence, or malfeasance by the other partner or representative at 
the time of occurrence and then failed to take reasonable steps to 
prevent or cure the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or 
malfeasance.132 
                                                     
 129. Susan Saab Fortney, High Drama and Hindsight: The LLP Shield, Post-Andersen, BUS. L. 
TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 46, 47. 
 130. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323A.0306(c) (West Supp. 2008). 
 131. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 206/306(c) (West 2004). 
 132. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(a)(2) (Vernon 2009). 
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Under both full and partial shield statutes, law firm partners remain 
liable for their own errors,133 and partners in direct supervisory roles may 
be liable for related failures.134  Individual partners’ potential vicarious 
liability, however, has been eliminated or at least seriously constrained. 
In short, equity partners in law firms registered as LLPs are generally 
shielded from liability for firm losses not caused by their own negligence 
or supervisory lapses.  Partial shield statutes afford equity partners less 
protection than do full shield statutes, of course, but even a partial shield 
affords substantial protection against personal liability.  It therefore 
makes little sense to argue that non-equity partners in LLPs are not true 
partners on the basis that they do not share in firm losses.135 
Second, non-equity partners are potentially bound to share in their 
firm’s losses, but the firm simply indemnifies them against this risk.  The 
firm indemnifies equity partners in the same fashion.  For example, a law 
firm partnership agreement might provide:136 
The Firm shall, subject to the other provisions of this Section, 
indemnify each partner and former partner who was a partner on or 
after [date] (an “Indemnified Partner”), with respect to any debt, 
obligation, expense or liability of, or chargeable to, the Firm or such 
Indemnified Partner (a “Liability” or “Liabilities”), whether arising in 
tort, contract, or otherwise, if and to the extent such Liabilities are 
incurred or are assumed by such Indemnified Partner in the course of 
(1) engaging in the practice of law on behalf of the Firm or (2) 
engaging in or serving in the management of the Firm and its activities 
except, in each case, to the extent such Indemnified Partner has been 
reimbursed under a policy of insurance.  No Indemnified Partner shall 
be entitled to indemnification for any Liability to the extent it results 
from such Indemnified Partner’s: 
(a) failure to act in good faith and in a manner in which such 
Indemnified Partner reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the 
Firm’s best interests; 
(b) reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or knowing material 
violation of the law; 
                                                     
 133. In re Reitz, 694 N.W.2d 894, 901–02 (Wis. 2005). 
 134. Fortney, supra note 129, at 47–48. 
 135. See Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 822 (“With the sharp contraction 
of liability for claims against partners [attributable to LLP status], the substantive distinctions that 
may otherwise exist between the liability of true partners and the liability of other participants in the 
firm diminishes.”). 
 136. Confidentiality obligations prevent me from identifying the law firms from whose 
partnership agreements the following indemnification provisions are adapted. 
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(c) failure to comply with written Firm policies which the 
Executive Committee has notified the partners must, in advance of the 
conduct in question, be complied with as a condition of indemnification 
hereunder; or 
(d) involvement in a proceeding in which the Firm is adverse to 
such Indemnified Partner (except in the case of any successful 
proceeding brought by the Indemnified Partner to enforce a right to 
indemnification or expense advancement hereunder). 
Alternatively, an indemnification provision in a law firm partnership 
agreement might state: 
The partnership shall indemnify and hold harmless each partner 
and former partner who is or was a party or is threatened to be made a 
party to any threatened, pending, or completed action, suit, or 
proceeding, whether administrative, civil, or criminal (other than an 
action by or in the right of the partnership) by reason of the fact that 
such person is or was a partner, or is or was serving at the request of the 
partnership as a trustee or administrator of any employee benefit or 
welfare plan established or maintained by the partnership for the 
benefit of partners or employees of the partnership, against expenses 
(including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines (including excise taxes 
assessed in connection with an employee benefit plan) and amounts 
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in 
connection with such action, suit, or proceeding.  Indemnification shall 
survive a partner’s death, retirement, or withdrawal from the 
partnership.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the partnership shall not 
be obligated: 
(a) To indemnify a partner or former partner against any liability 
(i) caused in whole or part by the partner’s gross negligence or willful 
misconduct, or (ii) to the extent such indemnification would be 
prohibited by applicable law; 
(b) To indemnify a partner or former partner against liability 
arising from any conduct that constituted a breach of the partner’s duty 
of loyalty to the partnership or for any transactions from which a 
partner or anyone affiliated with him or her derived an improper 
personal benefit; 
(c) To indemnify any partner or former partner with respect to any 
claim or proceeding initiated by such person against the partnership or 
its partners, agents or employees, unless the claim or proceeding (i) was 
authorized by the managing partner or (ii) is for the sole purpose of 
determining whether such person is entitled to indemnification 
hereunder; 
(d) To indemnify any partner or former partner for expenses or 
liabilities of any type whatsoever that have been paid directly to such 
0.6.0_RICHMOND FINAL 1/26/2010  2:49:10 PM 
526 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
person by an insurance carrier under a policy of insurance maintained 
by the partnership; or 
(e) To indemnify a former partner in respect to obligations of the 
partnership or in respect of any other partner for debts owed to the 
partnership. 
If a law firm indemnifies both equity and non-equity partners, as 
most do, then loss-sharing is not a substantial factor in determining 
whether a non-equity partner is truly a partner.  Even if that were not the 
case, and only non-equity partners were indemnified, it would remain 
true that a firm’s promise of indemnification is only as good as its ability 
to fulfill it, and if the firm is unable to do so—as perhaps in a bankruptcy 
or dissolution—then non-equity partners may be forced to share the 
firm’s losses.  This threat is unfortunately very real, given the many 
high-profile law firms that have failed in the recent past. 
Finally, to the extent loss-sharing is understood to mean that true 
partners earn less—or nothing—in years in which the partnership 
business declines or is unprofitable, such that non-equity partners who 
receive fixed compensation cannot be “partners” as a result, loss-sharing 
is still not determinative.  There are two reasons for this.  First, some 
equity partners negotiate fixed or guaranteed compensation with their 
firms.  It is especially common for lateral equity partners to have their 
compensation guaranteed for their first few years at their new firms.  
Second, law firms often do reduce non-equity partner compensation 
during lean periods, such that non-equity partners in fact share in firm 
losses so measured.137 
5. Sharing Risk 
If a court were to consider risk-sharing in evaluating whether a 
partnership exists, it would find nothing there to distinguish between 
equity and non-equity partners.  First, the LLP structure that now 
predominates among law firm partnerships has mooted many questions 
of partner liability and, thus, of risk-sharing.  Quite simply, many risks 
that partners in general partnerships once shared have been statutorily 
                                                     
 137. See, e.g., Heather Cole, Partners, Associates Learn of Pay Cuts, MO. LAW. WKLY., June 
12, 2009, at 1, 17 (reporting that a large Kansas City law firm running well behind budget withheld 
income from non-equity partners as well as equity partners because non-equity partners were also 
“owners of [the] firm”); Alana Roberts, Ruden McClosky Cuts Pay by 9 Percent, DAILY BUS. REV., 
June 30, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202431873641 (reporting 
that a large Florida law firm struggling financially reduced non-equity partner compensation by nine 
percent while equity partners were likely to see an eighteen percent reduction). 
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eliminated or severely restricted under the LLP regime.  As a result, 
“risk” in the sense of the unlimited personal liability that once 
characterized general partners and which separated them from 
employees,138 ought not be a material consideration when attempting to 
distinguish equity and non-equity partners in law firms.  Second, law 
firms generally indemnify both equity and non-equity partners against 
most firm- or practice-related risks.  The possibility that a firm might be 
unable to satisfy its indemnity obligations is potentially as consequential 
for non-equity partners as it is for equity partners.  Third, law firms today 
insure against almost all foreseeable risks at levels sufficient to protect 
partners against personal liability for even calamitous errors or 
occurrences.  Even if a risk were for some reason uninsured, or a loss or 
series of losses exceeded the limits of the firm’s applicable insurance, in 
the great majority of cases equity partners would still be insulated against 
personal liability by virtue of the firm’s status as an LLP.139 
6. Joint Control of the Firm 
One factor courts may consider in determining if a partnership exists 
is whether the parties exercise or participate in joint control over the 
enterprise,140 or at least have the right to do so.141  The rationale long 
offered for this rule is that control of a business enterprise “is so crucial 
that it is rarely entrusted to mere employees or independent 
contractors.”142  Applying this rationale to typical two-tier law firm 
partnerships leads to the conclusion that non-equity partners are 
generally bona fide partners.  In typical two-tier firms, for example, non-
equity partners vote on a variety of partnership matters,143 and often vote 
on all matters except the election of equity partners.144  Non-equity 
partners generally attend partnership meetings, participate in various 
aspects of firm management, and sit on firm committees.145  They 
                                                     
 138. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 274 (10th Cir. 1987) (discussing risk borne by 
general partners before the advent of the LLP structure). 
 139. This position, of course, assumes that a law firm is registered as an LLP rather than simply 
remaining a general partnership. 
 140. Peoples Bank v. Bryan Bros. Cattle Co., 504 F.3d 549, 557 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing 
Mississippi law); Wood v. Phillips, 823 So. 2d 648, 653 (Ala. 2001) (citing Vance v. Huff, 568 So. 
2d 745, 748 (Ala. 1990)); Ziegler v. Dahl, 691 N.W.2d 271, 277 (N.D. 2005). 
 141. Ziegler, 691 N.W.2d at 277. 
 142. GREGORY, supra note 125. 
 143. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 1.09[1]. 
 144. Kirkland, supra note 113. 
 145. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 1.09[1]. 
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generally have the right to view the law firm’s financial records.146  The 
fact that non-equity partners do not enjoy as much control over firm 
affairs as do equity partners does not force a different conclusion as to 
their status.147 
It is also important when analyzing the issue of joint control to 
consider the effect of centralized management on law firms, which “is a 
departure from the basic partnership norm of equal participation in [firm] 
management.”148  The traditional partnership structure in which the 
partners decide matters through common agreement and consensus no 
longer exists in many law firms.149  In typical large and mid-sized firms, 
most managerial decisions are entrusted to a managing partner, or 
executive or management committee.150  The few partnership decisions 
that these lawyers do not make are often delegated to select partners 
functioning as practice-group leaders.  Other operational decisions are 
left to non-partner managers holding titles such as “chief operating 
officer,” “executive director,” or “firm administrator.”  Partner 
compensation decisions are entrusted to a compensation or policy 
committee.  New lawyers are selected by hiring committees.  Firms’ 
futures are plotted by strategic planning committees.  In many large and 
mid-sized law firms, equity partners’ “joint control” is limited to electing 
colleagues to serve on the committees that manage all aspects of firm 
affairs.  Those elections are controlled by nominating committees and 
other groups selected or influenced by firm management, further 
reducing equity partners’ actual control over management of the 
enterprise.  Even small law firms delegate most operational decisions to a 
managing partner.  In summary, traditional conceptions of joint control 
of partnership affairs are clearly outdated in the large and mid-sized law 
firm context, where firms have essentially “outgrown the law under 
which they operate,”151 and are not necessarily valid even among smaller 
firms. 
                                                     
 146. § 6.02[3]. 
 147. See GREGORY, supra note 125, § 187 (discussing partnership’s ability to weight equity 
partners’ voting rights or to create classes of partners with differing rights). 
 148. Robert W. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, Corporate Law, and 
Private Ordering Within Closely-Held Business Associations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 171, 180–81 
(2005) [hereinafter Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm]. 
 149. Lauren Winters, Partners Without Power: Protecting Law Firm Partners from 
Discrimination, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 413, 436 (2005). 
 150. See Richard L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolution or 
Revolution?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1852 (2008) (referring to executive committees); Winters, 
supra note 149, at 437 (referring to managing partner and executive committee). 
 151. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm, supra note 148, at 183. 
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7. Capital Contributions 
Courts sometimes reason that the contribution of capital by members 
of an alleged partnership weighs favorably in finding that a partnership 
exists.152  It is certainly true that a person’s capital contribution to an 
enterprise may indicate the existence of a partnership.  There is, 
however, no requirement that partners contribute capital in order to 
create a partnership, or that a person must contribute capital to become a 
partner.153  The fact that non-equity partners do not contribute capital to 
their firms is therefore irrelevant to their status as a matter of partnership 
law.  Curiously, some firms require non-equity partners to contribute 
capital—albeit less than that required of equity partners—with the non-
equity partners then receiving fixed incomes rather than variable, and 
generally greater, incomes tied to the firm’s profitability.154  To the 
extent that a partner who contributes capital to a firm can be fairly 
described as “non-equity,” which seems like quite a reach, non-equity 
partners in these firms obviously are more likely to be characterized or 
treated as bona fide partners for all purposes. 
8. Holding Out as Partners 
Law firms hold out non-equity partners to the public as partners just 
as they do their equity partners.  Firms do not distinguish between equity 
and non-equity partners on their websites, on their letterhead, on 
lawyers’ business cards, in legal directories, in their hourly billing rates, 
in their public announcements of lateral hires, or in their marketing 
materials.  As an annual rite, law firms announce the election of new 
partners without distinguishing between equity and non-equity partners.  
Law firms permit non-equity partners to describe themselves as partners 
to courts, lawyers at other firms, existing clients, prospective clients, 
CLE program audiences, and the like.  The public generally cannot 
distinguish between equity and non-equity partners, and has no idea if a 
law firm has two partnership tiers.155  The same is often true of law firm 
                                                     
 152. In re Brokers, Inc., 363 B.R. 458, 469 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007). 
 153. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 2.02[3]. 
 154. See, e.g., Zach Lowe, Reed Smith to Ask Nonequity Partners to Pay Chunk of Salary to 
Firm, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=120243547 2073 (reporting that one 
large law firm is now requiring non-equity partners to contribute capital and thereafter become 
“fixed-share partners”); Capital and Voting Rights, MO. LAW. WKLY., May 18, 2009, at 2 
(discussing a large St. Louis law firm in which non-equity partners contribute approximately one-
third of the capital that equity partners are required to contribute). 
 155. CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 1.09[2]. 
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clients.  If a firm publicly represents that a lawyer is a partner and a 
third-party reasonably relies on that representation, that lawyer has 
apparent authority to perform all acts that a partner in the firm ordinarily 
would.156  In some cases, this kind of holding out may result in 
partnership by estoppel vis-à-vis third-parties.157 
It is true that even where the rights and duties of partnership exist in 
relation to third parties, the relation between partners themselves remains 
consensual.158  A good argument can therefore be made that 
“partnership” has a different meaning within a firm as compared to 
without.  Nonetheless, the fact that firms allow non-equity partners to 
hold themselves out as partners is compelling evidence that the equity 
partners in those firms intend a true partnership with their non-equity 
colleagues.  If they did not, they would require that non-equity partners 
identify themselves as “counsel,” “senior counsel,” “special counsel,” or 
“senior attorney,” rather than using the title “partner.” 
It is difficult for law firms to convincingly argue that non-equity 
partners are not partners for agency law or vicarious-liability purposes 
given the fashion in which they hold them out to the world as partners.159  
It is similarly disingenuous for non-equity partners to hold themselves 
out as partners when it is beneficial to do so but then deny or disclaim 
partner status when it has negative ramifications.  To deny partnership in 
either instance is to arguably engage in multiple ethical violations. 
For example, for a firm’s equity partners to claim that a non-equity 
partner who has been held out as a partner is not one is to potentially 
acknowledge deceit, dishonesty, and misrepresentation in those 
activities, and thus to admit violations of Model Rule 8.4(c).160  Such a 
claim might also be alleged to violate Model Rule 7.1, which prohibits 
lawyers from making false or misleading communications about their 
services;161 Model Rule 7.5(a), which forbids lawyers from using a 
professional designation that violates Rule 7.1;162 and Model Rule 7.5(d), 
which provides that lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a 
                                                     
 156. Dow v. Jones, 311 F. Supp. 2d 461, 468 (D. Md. 2004). 
 157. See Andrews v. Elwell, 367 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41–43 (D. Mass. 2005) (discussing partnership 
by estoppel but declining to decide the issue). 
 158. Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 627 (D.C. 1990). 
 159. See, e.g., PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, L.L.P., 58 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 516, 521–24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (finding a triable issue of fact concerning the law 
firm’s vicarious liability for a non-equity partner’s actions). 
 160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009) (prohibiting conduct involving 
“dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”). 
 161. R. 7.1. 
 162. R. 7.5(a). 
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partnership only when that is the fact.163  At least one bar’s ethics 
committee has reached some similar conclusions.164  On the law firm 
side, all equity partners will end up being liable under Model Rule 5.1(a) 
for allowing those violations to occur.165  From the individual lawyer’s 
perspective, the fact that the firm allowed or encouraged her to hold 
herself out as a partner is no defense to alleged violations of Rules 7.1, 
7.5, and 8.4(c), because lawyers are bound by ethics rules even when 
they are acting at the direction of another person.166 
C. Summary and Synthesis 
“Partnership” is an imprecise term.167  It refers to a contractual 
relationship that may vary widely in form and substance.168  Partners do 
not even have to appreciate that they are partners for a partnership to 
exist.169  Viewing partnership in this light, and considering the factors 
discussed previously, it is apparent that non-equity law firm partners are 
generally “partners” in the full legal meaning and context of the term.  
On the factors most critical to courts charged with evaluating alleged 
partnership relations—profit-sharing, loss-sharing, and joint control or 
equal participation in management—equity and non-equity partners are 
closely aligned.  Also important to courts evaluating whether 
partnerships exist is whether law firms clearly hold out their non-equity 
partners as partners.  This they generally do.  The differences between 
equity and non-equity partners—e.g., equity partners receive a greater 
share of firm profits because their income is not fixed, equity partners 
vote on admitting lawyers to equity partnership while non-equity 
                                                     
 163. R. 7.5(d). 
 164. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 740 (2008) (analyzing then-
New York DR 2-102(C), which, much like Model Rule 7.5(d), prohibited lawyers from holding 
themselves out as having a partnership with other lawyers unless they were in fact partners; applying 
that rule to law firms holding out non-equity partners as “partners;” and concluding that DR 2-
102(C) required “that attorneys holding themselves out to the public as partners, and the law firms in 
which they practice, be in fact partners under New York partnership law and their individual 
partnership agreements”). 
 165. R. 5.1(a) (providing that “[a] partner in a law firm . . . shall make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm 
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct”). 
 166. R. 5.2(a). 
 167. Southex Exhibitions, Inc. v. R.I. Builders Ass’n, 279 F.3d 94, 100 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 168. Boeckmann v. Mitchell, 909 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Ark. 1995) (quoting Zajac v. Harris, 410 
S.W.2d 593 (Ark. 1967)). 
 169. In re Lona, 393 B.R. 1, 14 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) (discussing California law); Dealers 
Supply Co. v. Cheil Indus., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (interpreting North 
Carolina law). 
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partners do not vote—do not foreclose the conclusion that non-equity 
partners are partners for purposes of partnership law. 
The essential question is what it means to acknowledge that non-
equity partners are true partners.  Certainly, accepting this conclusion has 
external implications for law firms and non-equity partners in terms of 
agency and vicarious liability.  It is less clear that non-equity partners’ 
status as true partners for partnership-law purposes is meaningful within 
law firm confines.  Partnership is a contractual relation as well as a 
fiduciary one, and partners are generally free to fix their rights by 
agreement.170  Thus, when it comes to their relations with their 
colleagues and firms, non-equity partners generally enjoy only those 
privileges and rights granted them in their firms’ partnership agreements.  
Their status as partners rather than employees does not, for example, 
entitle them to share in firm profits or assets contrary to the language in a 
partnership agreement, or allow them voting rights other than those 
contractually conferred. 
Non-equity partners’ status as partners may be consequential, 
however, where a law firm attempts to sever its relationship with them.  
The termination of a partner is referred to as expulsion, and expelling 
partners can be a difficult and potentially perilous exercise.171  A law 
firm that wishes to expel a partner must carefully adhere to the expulsion 
provision in its partnership agreement.172  The failure to do so exposes a 
firm to liability for breach of contract.173  In addition, the partner relation 
“is a fiduciary one, a relation of trust” that “carries with it the 
requirement of utmost good faith and loyalty.”174  Thus, a law firm that 
wishes to expel a partner must satisfy itself that its decision will 
withstand allegations of bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty by the 
expelled partner.  Although it is true that partners’ fiduciary duties to one 
another are substantially shaped by the terms of their partnership 
agreement,175 good faith and bad faith remain imprecise concepts.  In 
contrast, a law firm that wishes to terminate an associate’s or of-counsel-
                                                     
 170. Bailey v. Fish & Neave, 868 N.E.2d 956, 959 (N.Y. 2007); Booth v. Attorneys’ Title Guar. 
Fund, Inc., 20 P.3d 319, 326 (Utah 2001). 
 171. Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 393, 396 (1998). 
 172. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 490–92 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (construing 
partnership agreement strictly and finding that defendants breached the agreement in expelling 
partner because not all partners were notified of expulsion vote as required). 
 173. Id. at 492. 
 174. Della Ratta v. Larkin, 856 A.2d 643, 658 (Md. 2004). 
 175. Coffman v. Provost * Umphrey Law Firm, 161 F. Supp. 2d 720, 731–32 (E.D. Tex. 2001) 
(applying Texas law). 
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lawyer’s employment must only concern itself with much clearer anti-
discrimination laws. 
Recognizing non-equity partners as bona fide partners also has major 
professional responsibility implications.  Unlike associates and other 
employed lawyers, partners have broad supervisory responsibility for the 
conduct of other lawyers in their firm.  Partners must make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to rules of 
professional conduct.176  A partner who breaches this duty may be 
sanctioned apart and independent from any discipline imposed on the 
lawyers to whom her failure relates.177  Under Model Rule 5.1(c)(2), a 
partner is responsible for another lawyer’s violation of ethics rules if she 
knows of the other lawyer’s conduct “at a time when its consequences 
can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial 
action.”178  Partners have nearly identical professional responsibilities 
with respect to non-lawyer assistants.179 
III. DE-EQUITIZATION 
As explained previously, one of the paths that lawyers take to non-
equity status is a descending one.  Firms commonly de-equitize partners 
whom they perceive to be under-productive or unproductive.  For 
example, equity partnership is generally considered to require as 
essential qualifications the ability and willingness to attract new clients 
to a firm, the ability to retain existing clients, the capability to meet 
practice goals with a high degree of knowledge and skill, and the ability 
and willingness to accept independent responsibility for significant client 
matters.  These are not the only attributes required of equity partners, but 
they are critical ones.  Two-tier firms understandably operate on the basis 
that partners who do not satisfy all of these criteria should not enjoy 
equity status.  Firms may also de-equitize partners as punishment for 
disruptive internal behavior or major transgressions, such as conduct that 
materially impairs a key client relationship, or that is unprofessional or 
exposes the firm to liability. 
                                                     
 176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2009). 
 177. In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 12 (S.C. 2001). 
 178. R. 5.1(c)(2). 
 179. See R. 5.3(a) (providing that partners must make reasonable efforts to ensure that non-
lawyer assistants’ conduct is compatible with lawyers’ professional obligations); R. 5.3(c)(2) 
(making partners responsible for non-lawyer assistants’ misconduct where they know of it at a time 
that it can be avoided or mitigated but fail to take remedial action). 
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In recent years, law firms have de-equitized partners as a means of 
increasing profitability.180  This trend began in the 1990s and continues 
unabated.181  De-equitization is a superficially simple means of ratcheting 
up profitability, because the key measure of law firm profitability is 
profits per partner, and profits per partner are calculated solely based on 
a firm’s equity partners.  Among some groups, a firm’s willingness to de-
equitize partners is regarded as a sign of financial health.182  In other 
instances, de-equitization is perceived to have sinister overtones,183 as 
this tip in a blog post about partner de-equitizations at a large Chicago 
law firm reflects: 
Management just voted themselves massive raises while cutting the 
points of partners who are not politically connected. . . .  [O]ver the last 
few days, management is going office to office de-equitizing and 
partially de-equitizing tons of partners in an effort to raise the profits 
per partner number.  Those partners who are being de-equitized are no 
different than those who are permitted to keep their equity except those 
whose status remained intact have friends on management.184 
When it comes to firms’ ability to de-equitize partners, partnership 
statutes are silent.  The drafters of the UPA and RUPA never 
contemplated de-equitization.  Of course, partnership is a contractual 
relation.185  Partners may generally fix their rights by agreement.186  It 
follows that a law firm’s right to de-equitize partners arises, if at all, 
from its partnership agreement.  Attempting to de-equitize a partner 
absent a provision permitting that measure breaches the partnership 
agreement and potentially entitles the partner to damages.  The 
interpretation of a partnership agreement is a question of law.187 
An as-yet unanswered question is whether an expulsion provision in 
a partnership agreement is sufficient to authorize the lesser action of de-
                                                     
 180. Koppel, supra note 34, at B1 (reporting on the practice of de-equitizing to increase profits). 
 181. David B. Wilkins, Partner, Shmartner!  EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1264, 1265 (2007) (stating that de-equitization took hold among law firms in the 1990s). 
 182. Marcus, supra note 150, at 1851–52. 
 183. See, e.g., D’Amour v. Ohrenstein & Brown, LLP, No. 601418/2006, 2007 WL 4126386, at 
*3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2007) (alleging a “de-equitization scheme” to deprive partners of their 
partnership rights). 
 184. Posting of Elie Mystal to Above the Law, Jenner & Block: Problems Per Partner?, http:// 
abovethelaw.com/2009/05/jenner_block_problems_per_part_php. (May 7, 2009, 11:05 EST). 
 185. Clancy v. King, 954 A.2d 1092, 1100 (Md. 2008) (quoting Klein v. Weiss, 395 A.2d 126, 
141 (Md. 1978)). 
 186. Bailey v. Fish & Neave, 868 N.E.2d 956, 959 (N.Y. 2007). 
 187. Nationwide Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Troy Langley Constr. Co., 634 S.E.2d 502, 507 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2006); Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 745 N.W.2d 299, 308 (Neb. 2008); In re Dissolution of 
Midnight Star Enters., L.P., 724 N.W.2d 334, 336 (S.D. 2006). 
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equitization.  Logic suggests that it should be, even though the actions 
are different.  There is no compelling argument to the contrary.  
Partnership being a voluntary relation, a law firm’s right to completely 
sever a partner’s relationship with it impliedly encompasses the right to 
distance or reduce that relationship.  A partner who is unwilling to accept 
de-equitization is free to withdraw from the firm.  It would make no 
sense for a partner in a law firm with a partnership agreement that 
provided only for expulsion to contest her de-equitization on the ground 
that it was not contractually permitted when the probable consequence of 
her resistance would be expulsion.  Furthermore, law firm compensation 
processes provided for in partnership agreements typically allow firms to 
reduce partner compensation to levels so low that equity status is 
valueless, or nearly so.188  That being so, permitting de-equitization in the 
absence of express authority in a partnership agreement seems 
unremarkable.  As a practical matter, firms often present de-equitization 
as an alternative to expulsion, and with most partnership agreements 
clearly permitting the latter and courts routinely upholding law firms’ 
expulsion decisions,189 most lawyers have little incentive to contest the 
issue. 
In addition to the rights conferred under a partnership agreement, 
partners owe one another a duty of good faith and fair dealing that 
obliges them to consider their co-partners’ welfare in addition to their 
own.190  Partners cannot use the partnership agreement to contract away 
their duty of good faith and fair dealing.191  The duty of good faith and 
fair dealing either arises from the partnership agreement or is among 
partners’ fiduciary duties to one another.  Some courts and partnership 
scholars consider partners’ duty of good faith and fair dealing to be a 
creature of contract, which is logical considering that partnership 
agreements are contracts and the law implies a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in all contracts.192  Traditionally, however, courts have framed 
                                                     
 188. See, e.g., Julie Triedman, Tough Year at Dewey, AM. LAW., Apr. 2009, at 16 (reporting that 
a large law firm slashed sixty-six partners’ compensation by as much as eighty percent, in some 
cases lowering their compensation below that of first-year associates). 
 189. See, e.g., Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 346–48 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996) (rejecting partner’s expulsion challenge); Lawlis v. Kightligner & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 440–
43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding partner’s expulsion); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 
543, 546–47 (Tex. 1998) (upholding partner’s expulsion despite serious professional responsibility 
implications). 
 190. Eisenstein v. David G. Conlin, P.C., 827 N.E.2d 686, 693 (Mass. 2005) (quoting Meehan v. 
Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1263 (Mass. 1989)). 
 191. Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Alloy v. Wills 
Family Trust, 944 A.2d 1234, 1249–50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008). 
 192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see, e.g., Wilensky v. Blalock, 414 
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the duty of good faith in intra-partner affairs as an aspect or extension of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty.193 
Regardless of the duty’s source, it clearly applies to firms’ decisions 
to de-equitize partners.  It is therefore critical to determine what 
constitutes good faith, or perhaps more appropriately, what conduct 
evidences bad faith.  Partnership statutes offer little guidance here.  For 
example, RUPA leaves to courts the task of defining good faith and fair 
dealing “based on the experience of real cases.”194  RUPA presumes that 
courts will treat the good faith requirement as an exclusionary test, such 
that the phrase “good faith and fair dealing” has no general meaning of 
its own, but instead “‘functions to rule out many different forms of bad 
faith.’”195  In addition to the exclusionary test, courts evaluating 
allegations of bad faith may employ a cost-of-contracting analysis.196  
Cost-of-contracting analysis asks whether discretion in performing the 
contract, here a partnership agreement, is exercised in a fashion 
consistent with the parties’ reasonable expectations.197  The party vested 
with discretion in a matter breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing 
if it exercises its discretion in order to recapture its cost of contracting or 
to deprive the other party of the benefit of the bargain.198 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate whether either the 
exclusionary approach or cost-of-contracting analysis is preferable when 
analyzing the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the de-equitization 
context.  Despite firms’ widespread use of de-equitization as a 
management tool, there is a dearth of case law on the subject.  There are 
several reasons for this.  First, firms often present de-equitization as an 
alternative to expulsion or force it upon partners who lack professional 
alternatives; it is thus the lesser of two evils in each case.  Firms 
routinely offer to return de-equitized partners’ capital to them sooner 
than required under the partnership agreement and provide other 
                                                                                                                       
S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. 1992) (finding implied duty of good faith in oral partnership agreement); Phelps v. 
Frampton, 170 P.3d 474, 483 (Mont. 2007) (implying duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
partnership agreement). 
 193. See, e.g., Winston & Strawn, 664 N.E.2d at 245–46; Alloy, 944 A.2d at 1250; Phelps, 170 
P.3d at 482; Leigh v. Crescent Square, Ltd., 608 N.E.2d 1166, 1169–71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); 
Moore v. Moore, 599 S.E.2d 467, 472 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 194. ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 
(2007 ed.). 
 195. Id. (quoting Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales 
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 262 (1968)). 
 196. Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Partner Expulsions: Fiduciary Duty and Good Faith, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 181, 198 (1999). 
 197. Id. at 199. 
 198. Id. at 200. 
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sweeteners as incentives to acquiesce in their demotions.  In any event, 
de-equitization is presented in such a way or at such a time that 
contesting it is not a viable option.  Second, partners who consider de-
equitization intolerable may negotiate separation agreements with their 
firms and thereby avoid disputes.  Third, many law firm partnership 
agreements include arbitration provisions, meaning that de-equitization 
disputes are contested privately.  Fourth, when partners do challenge 
their de-equitization, and those challenges reasonably appear to be 
legitimate, firms are inclined to confidentially settle with the partner 
rather than risk any reputational injury that may attend litigation.  Fifth, 
many de-equitized partners likely view suing their law firms as career 
suicide.  Litigation will materially disrupt their current environment, may 
diminish their ability to move to another firm, and may ruin key 
relationships.  Sixth, for insecure partners who have been worried about 
their futures, de-equitization may be a relief from the pressures they feel, 
and thus be an acceptable step, especially if the compensation offered 
with the change is palatable. 
Kehoe v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon is a rare case in which a 
partner’s de-equitization was fully litigated.199  The plaintiff, Robert 
Kehoe, was elected to equity partnership with Wildman, Harrold, Allen 
& Dixon (“Wildman”) in 1979.200  In 1994, the firm’s management 
committee reviewed the productivity of all partners and negotiated 
separation packages with ten of them.201  Those partners resigned from 
the firm and received benefits normally paid to partners upon involuntary 
withdrawal.202  The management committee discussed Kehoe’s 
productivity but took no action against him.203 
In November 1995, the partnership approved a loan agreement with 
American National Bank (ANB) that required each equity partner to 
execute a guaranty in a form acceptable to ANB.  By February 1996, 
every equity partner except Kehoe had executed a personal guaranty; 
Kehoe refused to do so on the basis that he found some provisions in 
ANB’s proposed guaranty to be unacceptable.204  He said he would be 
willing to execute a personal guaranty if his concerns about the guaranty 
were satisfied.205  The ANB loan closed without Kehoe executing a 
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guaranty.206  ANB allowed Wildman to draw on its line of credit even 
though Kehoe never executed a guaranty.207 
In July 1996, the firm negotiated with ANB to modify some of the 
guaranty provisions to which Kehoe had objected.208  In Kehoe’s mind, 
these amendments eliminated the need for him to provide a personal 
guaranty.209  Although John Eisel, who chaired the management 
committee, told Kehoe that ANB still wanted a personal guaranty from 
every partner, Eisel never pressed the issue.210  ANB never approached 
Kehoe about his failure to execute a guaranty.211 
In a November 1996 partnership meeting, the management 
committee proposed a resolution that would allow the firm to de-equitize 
any partner who failed to personally guarantee the ANB loan.212  At the 
time, the firm’s partnership agreement provided that a partner could be 
de-equitized by an affirmative vote of at least sixty-seven percent of the 
partnership interests.213  Eisel presented the resolution to the partnership.  
Kehoe was present and was given the opportunity to speak, and he 
explained his objections.214  The resolution was put to a vote, and fifty-
five of the firm’s sixty-one equity partners voted for it.215  Afterwards, 
several partners implored Kehoe to sign a guaranty in order to preserve 
his status as an equity partner, but he declined to do so.216 
The resolution took effect on January 1, 1997, and Wildman then 
considered Kehoe a non-equity partner.217  On January 2, Kehoe 
requested that Wildman pay him his capital.218  The firm refused.219  
Kehoe then sued Wildman and six partners—including Eisel and the 
other members of the management committee—for breach of contract 
and breach of fiduciary duty.220  Kehoe alleged that he should receive his 
capital as separation payments provided for in the partnership agreement 
as though he had involuntarily withdrawn from the firm, which would 
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entitle him to a payout of $405,116.221  The firm countered that Kehoe’s 
change in status from equity to non-equity partner was merely that—a 
change in status.222  He was still allowed to practice law at Wildman.  
When he later chose to leave the firm, he did so voluntarily, and thus was 
not entitled to separation payments as though he had involuntarily 
withdrawn.223 
The trial court determined that the Wildman partnership agreement 
was ambiguous and instructed the jury to determine whether Kehoe’s de-
equitization amounted to an involuntary withdrawal from the firm.224  
The jury found for Kehoe on both his breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims and awarded damages of $405,116.225  After the 
trial court denied their motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
the defendants appealed.226 
The Kehoe court first took up the issue of whether Wildman’s 
partnership agreement was ambiguous, that is, whether it was “‘capable 
of being understood in more sense than one.’”227  In doing so, it noted 
that the defendants focused on the agreement’s separation payments 
provision, which stated: 
If an equity partner’s separation results from his or her involuntary 
withdrawal, the firm shall pay to the withdrawn partner . . . a sum equal 
to twice his or her Base Amount.  Payment shall be made in one 
hundred twenty (120) equal monthly installments, commencing on the 
last day of the month following the month in which separation 
occurred.228 
The plaintiff, on the other hand, honed in on the agreement’s 
definition of involuntary withdrawal, which provided: 
The term “involuntary withdrawal” . . . shall mean the withdrawal of a 
partner from the firm as a result of (i) action taken by the other 
partners, which action shall be by not less than sixty-seven percent of 
the share interest held by the partners; (ii) compelling reasons of health, 
which shall be defined as any condition preventing said individual from  
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practicing law or engaging in any other gainful employment anywhere, 
or (iii) death.229 
The court focused on the portion of the involuntary withdrawal 
definition that spoke of “action taken by the other partners.”230  The 
defendants argued that there could be no involuntary withdrawal without 
a partner being required to withdraw from the firm, but the court found 
no such requirement in the definition of involuntary withdrawal.231  
Because Kehoe withdrew from the firm as a result of the sufficient 
partnership vote to de-equitize him, his withdrawal was arguably 
involuntary and the jury was free to so decide.232  The fact that Kehoe 
might have chosen to remain with Wildman as a non-equity partner 
instead of withdrawing did not cure the ambiguity.  As the court 
explained: 
The “involuntary withdrawal” provision was capable of being 
understood as applying to withdrawal of a partner when his withdrawal 
is required by the requisite vote of the other partners or where the 
action taken by the requisite vote of the other partners forced, but did 
not compel, the withdrawal of a partner.  Contrary to the Firm’s 
implied argument, the express provisions of the agreement do not, as a 
matter of law, require that at least 67% of the partners “vote to 
terminate” the plaintiff as a partner . . . before separation benefits are 
owed. . . . That the plaintiff was “welcome to, and indeed expected to, 
practice law at the firm after January 1, 1997” as a nonequity partner 
did not preclude the jury from deciding that the plaintiff was entitled to 
separation benefits because he was forced to withdraw by the passage 
of the resolution . . . .233 
While the court affirmed the judgment against Wildman for breach 
of contract, it reversed the judgment against the individual defendants on 
the same theory.234  This was an easy decision because the partnership 
agreement stated that the firm was obligated to pay all separation 
benefits from its net income.235  The court rejected Kehoe’s claim that 
the individual defendants were liable as a matter of partnership law on 
the basis that he had not alleged a violation of the Illinois partnership  
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law—he had alleged a breach of contract, and the contract made clear 
that separation benefits were a firm obligation.236 
The court next turned to Kehoe’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.  
Kehoe alleged that the individual defendants had breached fiduciary 
duties to him by (a) failing to advise the other partners of the July 1996 
amendments to the guaranty requirement, (b) advising the other partners 
that he was unwilling to execute a guaranty, (c) not advising him that not 
all partners supplied personal financial statements, (d) implying that his 
refusal to execute a guaranty jeopardized the firm’s financing, (e) not 
telling the other partners that his concerns might be satisfactorily 
resolved, (f) recommending the de-equitization resolution so as to 
terminate his partnership, and (g) providing a pretextual rationale for the 
resolution.237 
Kehoe’s breach of fiduciary duty claim quickly floundered in light of 
Illinois precedent focusing on partners’ fiduciary obligations not to make 
secret profits at their co-partners’ expense and to fully disclose to other 
partners all information that may be of value to the partnership.238  
Kehoe’s allegations did not remotely approach a claim that the individual 
defendants’ actions constituted secret dealings contrary to the 
partnership’s interests, that their actions somehow deprived Wildman of 
profits it otherwise would have earned, or that by voting to de-equitize 
him, the defendants somehow enriched or enhanced themselves at the 
firm’s expense.239  Furthermore: 
 The requisite number of partners might well have voted in favor of 
the resolution even if they had been provided with the information the 
plaintiff contends was either concealed or misstated for the most 
obvious reason: to remain an equity partner, one had to agree to share 
the same risks with the other partners. . . .  
. . . . 
[A]s the partner defendants point out, the plaintiff was provided an 
opportunity to argue his position against the adoption of the resolution 
at the [partnership] meeting.  The plaintiff either failed to present his 
case completely, or if he did, he failed to persuade.  Having made his  
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case to the other partners and lost, we question his right to carry on his 
fight . . . .240 
Finally, Kehoe’s breach of fiduciary duty claims against the 
individual defendants were inextricably linked to his contract claim 
against the firm.  The damages sought for the alleged fiduciary breaches 
were based solely on the firm’s failure to pay Kehoe separation benefits 
he was due.241  Had the firm read the partnership agreement the way the 
jury did and paid Kehoe separation benefits, the partners’ vote for the 
resolution permitting his de-equitization would have been irrelevant.242  
Accordingly, Kehoe’s breach of fiduciary duty claims against his former 
partners failed for a lack of proximate cause.243  While the Kehoe court 
ultimately affirmed the plaintiff’s judgment against Wildman for breach 
of contract, it reversed the trial court in all other respects.244 
Kehoe is unremarkable from a contract law perspective.  Wildman’s 
partnership agreement was vague and the firm paid for that imprecision.  
As for Kehoe’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, it is settled that a law firm 
may expel a partner for conduct that produces a partnership schism 
without the partners who vote for expulsion breaching their duties of 
good faith and fair dealing to the partner voted out.245  By analogy, 
partners should be able to vote to de-equitize a co-partner who creates a 
schism in their firm without being guilty of a fiduciary breach. 
Partners breach their duty of good faith and fair dealing if they expel 
a co-partner for economically predatory purposes or for exercising rights 
conferred under their partnership agreement.246  The same principles 
necessarily apply to partner de-equitizations.  Thus, Kehoe might have 
been able to sustain a tort claim if he could have demonstrated that the 
partners he sued acted predatorily in supporting the resolution that 
allowed his demotion.  That appears to have been what he was getting at 
when he alleged that those partners provided a “pretextual rationale” for 
the resolution.247  The problem for Kehoe was that no evidence showed 
that he was de-equitized for economically predatory purposes.  The 
resolution that imperiled his equity interest was well known to him; 
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indeed, Kehoe was allowed to speak in opposition to it at the partnership 
meeting at which the resolution was called to a vote.248  Although 
Kehoe’s de-equitization might seem petty given that his unwillingness to 
execute a personal guaranty was apparently inconsequential to ANB, the 
record indicates that he was demoted for his disharmonious behavior 
rather than as a pretext to steal his clients or unfairly re-distribute his 
share of firm profits.  Colleagues implored him to change his position to 
avoid de-equitization, yet he stubbornly refused to do so.249  There was 
nothing to suggest that their efforts were insincere, or that the lawyers 
who urged Kehoe to reconsider his position were unaware of a 
management plot against him.  The fact that a more charitable law firm 
might not have de-equitized Kehoe for his intransigence does not mean 
that the Wildman partners breached their duties of good faith and fair 
dealing by proceeding as they did.  Kehoe had ample opportunities to 
avoid being de-equitized and squandered them all. 
From a practical perspective, two-tier partnerships must be able to 
demote equity partners for legitimate reasons if they are to function 
efficiently.  If, for example, a law firm is unable or unwilling to de-
equitize undeserving or unproductive equity partners, or equity partners 
who no longer satisfy the criteria for equity status, then valued non-
equity partners and aspiring associates will quickly come to see the two-
tier system as artificial and unfair.  There is substantial risk that they will 
eventually become dissatisfied with the partnership structure and their 
related prospects to the point that they leave the firm, thereby undoing all 
the benefits that two-tier partnership was intended to achieve. 
If either courts or lawyers are tempted to downplay this functional 
need, there are at least four reasons they ought not to.  First, most law 
firms have equity partners who achieved that status before the firms 
converted to two-tier partnerships.  Were some of those same partners up 
for partnership today, they would be considered only for non-equity 
positions.  It is unfair to their colleagues, and unhealthy for their firms, 
for these partners to escape the accountability or productivity that they 
require of those aspiring to their partner status.  Firms must be able to de-
equitize partners fitting this description if their performance warrants it.  
Second, lawyers’ practices commonly change over time.  If changes to 
equity partners’ practices are negative from a profitability standpoint or 
otherwise, firms must be able to address those changes.  De-equitization 
may be an appropriate adjustment in some instances.  Third, some equity 
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partnership decisions may prove to be mistakes.  A firm that errs in 
making a lawyer an equity partner ought to have a remedial option short 
of expulsion.  Finally, lateral movement among lawyers is now 
routine.250  Lawyers may change firms several times over their careers.  
For gifted non-equity partners and associates who are dissatisfied with 
their firms’ partnership structures, relocation to other firms is often a 
viable option. 
IV. PARTNERSHIP AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Non-equity partnership has perhaps drawn the most attention for its 
employment law aspects.251  During recessions and times of economic 
stress for individual law firms, non-equity partners are thought to be 
vulnerable to layoffs.252  This perceived vulnerability is principally 
attributable to the perception that non-equity partners are employees 
rather than partners.253  The belief that non-equity partners are employees 
has employment law implications in that anti-discrimination statutes, 
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans With 
Disabilities Act (ADA) protect “employees” against unlawful 
discrimination.254  As a rule, partners are considered to be employers, not 
employees, and, therefore, are not protected against adverse employment 
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action under federal anti-discrimination laws.255  This is particularly true 
in the law firm context.256  Courts have historically been reluctant to 
extend employment law principles “to the management of a law firm by 
its partners” given that the relationships among law partners “differ 
markedly” from employer-employee relationships.257 
Courts’ traditional differentiation between partners and employees 
when enforcing anti-discrimination laws has been viewed by some as 
being one of the chief benefits of non-equity partner status.  As one 
scholar observed, “[t]he biggest advantage that non-equity partners have 
over equity partners . . . is access to the remedial provisions of federal 
laws prohibiting workplace discrimination.”258  Or, as a commentator 
recently noted when discussing associates’ partnership aspirations: 
“[A]ssociates may appreciate that non-equity partners, who are not 
considered partners under . . . employment law, can avoid . . . the loss of 
significant workplace rights.  These additional legal rights may be valued 
by associates who worry . . . about potential adverse employment-related 
actions against them.”259 
It is highly doubtful that any lawyer would favor non-equity over 
equity partnership based on potential employment law protections, and it 
is only minimally more likely that lawyers who have achieved any 
partnership status give the employment law ramifications of their 
positions a moment’s thought until professional disaster looms.  For that 
matter, it is seldom easy for a plaintiff to prove a claim under federal 
anti-discrimination statutes, and the mere right to sue under such laws 
probably affords savvy lawyers little comfort.  Even if state anti-
discrimination laws are more favorable to plaintiffs than their federal 
analogs, it is still doubtful that they offer lawyers meaningful assurance.  
Regardless, the distinction between equity and non-equity partnership is 
simply not the momentous employment law consideration that lawyers 
and scholars may believe.  Courts have recognized for a while now that 
the centralized management common among large professional 
partnerships has so blurred the line between partners and employees that 
partners may sometimes enjoy the protection of anti-discrimination 
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laws.260  The title “partner” is not itself determinative in employment 
disputes.261 
For law firms, the partner versus employee paradigm materially 
shifted in 2002 with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Sidley 
Austin Brown & Wood.262  The Sidley case arose out of a 1999 decision 
by the leaders of Sidley & Austin (“Sidley”), as the firm was then 
known, to demote thirty-two equity partners to “counsel” or “senior 
counsel” status.263  None of the demoted partners filed a charge of 
discrimination against the firm.264  Even so, the EEOC launched an 
investigation into the firm’s possible violation of the ADEA and 
subpoenaed a variety of information from the firm.  To prove an ADEA 
violation, the EEOC had to show that the partners were in fact employees 
before their demotions.265  When Sidley resisted the subpoena the district 
court ordered the firm to comply fully and Sidley appealed.266 
Sidley challenged the EEOC’s jurisdiction to investigate the 
demotions on the basis that a partner is an employer within the meaning 
of the federal anti-discrimination laws if (a) her income included a share 
of the firm’s profits, (b) she contributed capital to the firm, (c) she is 
liable for firm debts, and (d) she has some administrative or managerial 
duties.267  The court’s focus, however, quickly shifted to the firm’s 
centralized management structure: the firm was controlled by an 
executive committee that held the other partners at its “mercy” by 
controlling their income and status within the firm.268 
Sidley had met Illinois’s requirements for forming and maintaining a 
partnership, and the demoted partners certainly were partners for state 
law purposes.269  The EEOC, however, argued that partner status was not 
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the same for purposes of state and federal law.270  The court’s concern 
was whether the partners were employers under the ADEA, and the court 
was not satisfied that partner status established employer status.  As the 
court explained in comparing the firm to a corporation: 
This case . . . . involves a partnership of more than 500 partners in 
which all power resides in a small, unelected committee (it has 36 
members).  The partnership does not elect the members of the 
executive committee; the committee elects them, like the self-
perpetuating board of trustees of a private university or other charitable 
foundation.  It is true that the partners can commit the firm, for example 
by writing opinion letters; but employees of a corporation, when acting 
within the scope of their employment, regularly commit the corporation 
to contractual undertakings, not to mention tort liability.  Partners who 
are not members of the executive committee share in the profits of the 
firm; but many corporations base their employees’ compensation in 
part anyway, but sometimes in very large part, on the corporation’s 
profits, without anyone supposing them employers.  The participation 
of the 32 demoted partners in committees that have . . . merely 
administrative functions does not distinguish them from executive 
employees in corporations.  Corporations have committees and the 
members of the committees are employees; this does not make them 
employers.  Nor are the members of the committees on which the 32 
serve elected; they are appointed by the executive committee.  The 32 
owned some of the firm’s capital, but executive-level employees often 
own stock in their corporations. . . . [T]here is authority that employee 
shareholders of professional corporations are still employees, not 
employers, for purposes of federal antidiscrimination law.271 
The court found the demoted partners’ personal liability for the 
firm’s debts significant, but this factor did not outweigh the other 
considerations.272  The fact that the demoted partners were bona fide 
partners did not determine whether they were employers, and their 
personal liability was relevant only to the former.273  It was conceivable 
that the two classes at issue—partners under state law and employers 
under federal law—did not overlap.274  The Sidley case ultimately settled 
for the collective sum of $27.5 million.275  For purposes of the 
settlement, Sidley also admitted that the demoted partners were 
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employees within the meaning of the ADEA.276  Of course, the firm did 
not admit that it violated the ADEA in demoting them.277 
The Sidley court did not hold that the demoted partners were 
employees, or that they were entitled to ADEA protection.  The decision 
should not be interpreted to mean that law firms cannot de-equitize or 
expel partners who are not performing the functions expected of partners, 
or who are not doing so satisfactorily.  The case is of lasting significance, 
however, because equity partners are increasingly vulnerable to dramatic 
compensation adjustments and involuntary separation from their firms as 
part of firms’ continuing quest to enhance, or at least maintain, their 
profitability.278  As a result of the Sidley decision, law firms making such 
decisions now consider the employment law aspects of them more 
carefully than they perhaps previously appreciated or understood. 
Shortly after Sidley was decided, the Supreme Court, in Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, was called upon to determine 
whether four physicians who were shareholder-directors in a professional 
corporation were employees within the meaning of the ADA.279  
Focusing on the element of control, the Court identified six factors that 
are relevant to the determination of whether a shareholder-director is an 
employee: (1) whether the organization can hire or fire the individual, or 
set the rules and regulations governing her work, (2) whether and to what 
extent the firm organization supervises the individual’s work, (3) 
whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization, (4) 
whether and to what extent the individual is able to influence the 
organization, (5) whether the parties intended the individual be an 
employee as expressed in written agreements or contracts, and (6) 
whether the individual shares in the organization’s liabilities, losses, and 
profits.280  These factors are not exhaustive,281 and no one of them alone 
is decisive.282 
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The Court in Clackamas focused on whether a professional 
corporation was an employer under the ADA; it did not address whether 
a director-shareholder could sue such an organization for unlawful 
discrimination.283  It is clear, however, that courts may employ the 
Clackamas factors to determine whether law firm partners are employees 
for employment law purposes.284 
Solon v. Kaplan illustrates the application of the Clackamas factors 
in the law firm context.285  James Solon was one of four equity partners 
in a Chicago law firm organized as a general partnership.286  He served as 
the firm’s managing partner for approximately two years and, after 
relinquishing that post, remained involved in the firm’s administration.287  
Unfortunately, the firm’s three name partners lost confidence in Solon’s 
administrative, legal, and rainmaking skills, and decided to remove him 
as a partner.288  They offered him the option of remaining with the firm 
as an administrator or independent contractor, but he refused.289  Solon 
left the firm and then sued it and the name partners for allegedly 
violating Title VII and the ADEA in connection with his departure.290  
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and 
Solon appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit applied the Clackamas factors and 
concluded that “no reasonable juror could find that Solon was an 
employee of the firm.”291  Without delving into all the details, Solon was 
one of four equity partners and could be removed only by a unanimous 
vote of the other three partners; he exercised substantial control over the 
allocation of the firm’s profits; because new equity partners could be 
added only by a unanimous vote of the existing equity partners, he 
possessed veto power over new partner admissions; and, unlike the 
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firm’s “special partners,” he shared in the firm’s profits, had access to the 
firm’s financial information, and attended partnership meetings.292  The 
fact that the firm forced him out without affording him notice and an 
opportunity to be heard did not reveal a lack of control supporting his 
characterization as an employee, nor did the fact that he consulted with 
his fellow partners before making major decisions in his role as 
managing partner.  The firm’s partnership agreement did not require 
notice or a hearing as a condition of removing a partner,293 and Solon’s 
collaborative leadership style suggested only that he was “passive”—not 
“powerless.”294  The Solon court thus affirmed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment.295 
At the end of the day, whether law firm partners are entitled to the 
protection of anti-discrimination laws pivots not on their status as equity 
partners or non-equity partners, but on their workplace control as 
measured by the Clackamas factors.  The greater the level of partners’ 
control over their professional environments, the less likely they are to be 
considered employees for anti-discrimination law purposes.  That said, 
not all partners must be equal.  For example, a firm’s differentiation 
between partners based on the size of their equity interests does not 
automatically transform partners with relatively small equity interests 
into employees.296  As a Texas federal court has explained: 
The Clackamas inquiry is designed to identify situations in which an 
employee is given a title traditionally reserved for someone in an 
ownership position without any of the attendant rights, privileges, and 
responsibilities of control.  In such an instance, a shareholder, director, 
or partner may in fact be an employee.  However, the Clackamas 
inquiry does not suggest that a partner in a partnership may be 
designated as an “employee” merely because some other partner has  
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been granted more of the rights, privileges, and responsibilities 
traditionally attendant to partnership.297 
Control may similarly be an issue under state employment law.298 
The outcome of any case decided by application of the Clackamas 
factors will turn on its facts.  Partnerships are not all alike.  Depending 
on the characteristics of the law firm, equity partners may be able to 
establish that they are employees within the meaning of anti-
discrimination laws, just as non-equity partners might.299  On the other 
hand, equity partners who hold nominal stakes in their firms and are 
vulnerable to domination by more senior partners with greater interests 
may still be deemed bona fide partners and not employees for purposes 
of anti-discrimination laws.300  Equity versus non-equity partner status, 
without more, is simply not the meaningful employment law divide that 
many lawyers and observers seem to believe. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Two-tier partnerships are now standard in large and mid-sized law 
firms.  Non-equity partner ranks are growing far faster and larger than 
equity partner numbers.  It is therefore important to understand what it 
means to be a non-equity partner.  Contrary to the many claims by 
lawyers and scholars that non-equity partners are not true partners, in 
most cases that is exactly what they are as a matter of partnership law.  
There are differences between equity and non-equity partners to be sure, 
but none relegate non-equity partners to some lesser category of 
association.  As with equity partners, non-equity partners’ rights and 
obligations are principally determined by their firms’ partnership 
agreements.  Equity and non-equity partners have equal supervisory 
responsibilities under ethics rules.  Both equity and non-equity partners 
may be entitled to protection against unlawful employment actions under 
federal and state anti-discrimination laws depending on the facts of the 
particular case.  Courts, lawyers, and scholars must understand that the 
proper emphasis in the term “non-equity partner” is not on “non-equity,” 
but on “partner.” 
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